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Free Speech Rights at Work: Resolving the Differences 
between Practice and Liberal Principle 
 
Paul Wragg* 
 
ACAS reports increasing disciplinary action against employees over expression that 
employers dislike.  Given the prominence of social media in contemporary life this is a 
significant current legal issue yet one which has attracted relatively little academic comment.  
This paper examines the compatibility of unfair dismissal doctrine in this context with 
traditional liberal principle.  Arguably, doctrine provides only flimsy protection.  Although 
the common law recognises the importance of individual autonomy generally when 
determining rights claims this well-established liberal value appears to have little influence 
on unfair dismissal doctrine.  The dominant academic view on realising greater workplace 
human rights protection through greater application of the proportionality principle is 
unlikely to address this problem; reconceptualization of the substantive free speech right at 
stake is required.  This paper offers a strategy on how this might be achieved – and so how 
differences between practice and principle might be reconciled – through a sympathetic 
reading of the Strasbourg and UK jurisprudence and potential policy-maker intervention. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Dismissals concerning employee use of social media are rising, according to ACAS.1  This 
trend may seem unremarkable where the expression at stake is hostile and directed toward 
employers,2 colleagues3 and/or customers4 (assuming the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 
is inapplicable).  Yet the trend includes dismissals where the connection between speech and 
employment is more tenuous, which is troubling.  Surveying decided cases, including those 
involving more conventional forms of speech, there is a palpable sense that disciplinary 
action against employees is often motivated by management’s idiosyncratic, subjective 
perspectives on the employee’s behaviour, and that courts and employment tribunals are 
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in 2013.  Earlier drafts were presented at the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, Boston, Mass., 
USA, 2013; to the School of Law at the University of Exeter, February, 2014; to the SCRIPT Centre, University 
of Edinburgh, April, 2014 and at the GELP conference, University of Kingston, May, 2014.  The author is 
grateful for helpful comments received from participants, and would particularly like to thank James Weinstein, 
David Campbell, Lucy Vickers, Gwyneth Pitt, James Devenney, Melanie Williams, James Griffin, Daithi 
MacSithigh, Alastair Mullis, Simon Deakin and the anonymous reviewers for ILJ.  The usual disclaimer applies.  
All websites accessed 12 November 2014. 
1 A. Broughton, T. Higgins, B. Hicks and A. Cox, (2010) ACAS Research Paper: ‘Workplaces and Social 
Networking: the Implications for Employment Relations’, 12 (‘ACAS Report’). 
2 Crisp v Apple Retail, Case No ET/1500258/2011, November 2011, (referred to in D. McGoldrick, ‘The Limits 
of Freedom of Expression on Facebook and Social Networking Sites: A UK Perspective’ (2013) 13(1) HRLR 
125, 142). 
3 Teggart v Teletech UK [2004] IRLR 625. 
4 Preece v JD Wetherspoon plc, Case No ET/2104806/10, May 2011, (referred to in McGoldrick, n 2, 139). 
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over-indulging such responses when determining claims.  In particular, as will be shown, the 
harm of the expression to the employer’s interests is often either assumed or otherwise 
ignored, as if it were an apparently unimportant consideration.  Simultaneously, courts and 
tribunals do not, as a matter of course, consider the extent to which the employee’s right to 
freedom of expression under Art 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) 
is engaged in such cases.  On those rare occasions where the right is considered, the analysis 
is often superficial.  As will be shown, by assuming that Art 10 is concerned to protect 
‘important speech’ the courts and tribunals diminish the value of the right in an employment 
context.  This is disappointing since, even though the disliked expression may be offensive, 
disturbing or inane, there are important matters of free speech principle at stake in these cases 
that have nothing to do with the apparent societal value of the expression.  Consequently, it 
will be argued that employee free speech rights are not being taken seriously. 
Admittedly, the minimalistic protection of human rights in the workplace is a familiar 
complaint and a sizeable literature on it exists.5  By far the most persuasive argument is that 
greater judicial engagement with the proportionality principle is required.6  Yet even if this 
strategy were adopted more consistently employees would not necessarily be better protected 
due to the weak conceptualisation of the right to free speech apparent in the doctrinal 
approach.  Further discussion is required on how to better protect employee free speech rights 
whilst preserving legitimate employer interests.  So far, the debate has approached the issue 
narrowly, focusing on the limitations that contract imposes on employers who discipline 
employees over disliked expression, 7  and has largely ignored, or has otherwise made 
assumptions about, underlying issues concerning the nature and meaning of employee free 
speech rights.  As a result, the case for the protection of spontaneous and disliked trivial 
speech has not been made out, doctrinally or normatively.  This paper addresses this lacuna 
by challenging the prevailing view that the right to freedom of speech in the UK and Europe 
protects, and should protect, expression based upon its discernible social value, narrowly 
defined.  It will be argued that this approach is incompatible with the traditional liberal 
argument, found elsewhere in the law, that the legitimacy of an interference with human 
autonomy depends upon the extent of the harm caused by the actor’s behaviour and not upon 
appraisal of its apparent inherent worth.  This paper offers a strategy on how this argument 
might be realised in practice through a concerted and sympathetic treatment by the judiciary 
of the free speech principles evident in the domestic and supranational jurisprudence, and 
buttressed by modification of the ACAS guidance on social media. 
 
2. The Distance between Practice and Liberal Principle 
                                                          
5 See, eg, G. Morris, ‘Fundamental Rights: Exclusion by Agreement?’ (2001) 30 ILJ 49; L. Vickers, ‘The 
Protection of Freedom of Political Opinion in Employment’ (2002) EHRLR 468; A. McColgan, ‘Do Human 
Rights Disappear in the Workplace?’ (2003) EHRLR 119; L. Vickers, ‘Unfair Dismissal and Human Rights’ 
(2004) 33 ILJ 52; H. Collins, ‘The Protection of Civil Liberties in the Workplace’ (2006) 69 MLR 619; V. 
Mantouvalou, ‘Human Rights and Unfair Dismissal: Private Acts in Public Spaces’ (2008) 71 MLR 912; H. 
Collins, K. Ewing and A. McColgan, Labour Law, (CUP, 2012); H. Collins and V. Mantouvalou, ‘Redfearn v 
UK: Political Association and Dismissal’ (2013) 76 MLR 909, 917-921; A. Sanders, ‘The law of unfair 
dismissal and behaviour outside work’ (2014) 34(2) Legal Studies 328. 
6 See Mantouvalou, n 5, in particular. 
7 See, eg, McGoldrick, n 2.  
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a) Employee free speech rights in practice 
 
Social media usage is a prevalent feature of modern life and the publication of frequent, 
impetuous and sometimes brutal observations is seen as normal.  This attitude generates risks 
that, ACAS reports,8 users are often apparently oblivious to.  When a message is transmitted, 
the author has limited or no control over who reads it or over subsequent dissemination.  
Where it offends others it is understandable that employers may fear damage to their business 
interests through association with the employee.  As ACAS also reports, there is growing 
evidence of employers disciplining employees not only for online expression critical of the 
organisation but also for ‘using social media to express views which employers do not wish 
to be connected with their organisation’.9  Examples of this reaction are readily identifiable in 
the press, such as the trainee accountant who was suspended following bad publicity over her 
tweet: ‘definitely knocked a cyclist off his bike earlier – I have right of way he doesn’t even 
pay road tax #bloodycyclists’10 or the trainee solicitor who, whilst apparently drunk, appeared 
to suggest in a YouTube video that his job involved ‘fucking people over for money’.11  His 
employer took particular exception and commented publicly that his job was in jeopardy.  
Similarly, a PR executive was dismissed following public outrage at her tweet: ‘Going to 
Africa.  Hope I don’t get AIDS.  Just kidding.  I’m white’.12 
Yet, as these examples also show, not only may the expression have little or no direct 
connection to the employer’s organisation but also it may be difficult to identify, objectively, 
how the expression, or the hostile reaction to it, undermines the employee’s ability to perform 
their job.  Where disciplinary action follows, the adequacy of the doctrinal response to this 
phenomenon is questionable.  Although there is a paucity of cases, the discernible similarities 
between them indicate claims are resolved with little or no meaningful engagement with the 
attendant free speech rights at stake.  This leaves the employee’s claim vulnerable and 
deprived of a potentially valuable argument in its favour.  Matters are also complicated by the 
limited availability of human rights protection for claimants.  The right to freedom of 
expression under Art 10 can be relied upon only where the employer is a public authority or 
where the claim has a statutory basis.13 
Smith v Trafford Housing Trust14 is paradigmatic.  The claimant was demoted for 
expressing the view, on Facebook, that same sex marriage in church was ‘an equality too far’.  
Although successful in his claim for breach of contract, the outcome would have been 
different, the court noted, if Mr Smith had ‘promoted’ his view in the workplace (as in 
proselytising or canvassing)15 or if it had been expressed in more intemperate terms so as to 
cause ‘genuine offence’ to colleagues on Facebook16 since either eventuality would have 
breached the employer’s policy and justified the demotion.  Admittedly, this was a wrongful 
                                                          
8 N 1, 32. 
9 N 1, 12. 
10 Daily Mail, 23 May 2013. 
11 The Independent, 13 September 2013. 
12 The Telegraph, 23 December 2013. 
13 X v Y [2004] EWCA Civ 662, [18]. 
14 [2012] EWHC 3221 (Ch). 
15 ibid, [65]-[79]. 
16 ibid, [80]-[85]. 
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dismissal claim, so it was understandable that the court would focus on the narrow question 
of whether the terms of the contract, express 17  or implied, 18  allowed the employer to 
discipline the employee for expressing an opinion.  However, there remains something 
distinctly intellectually unsatisfying about the treatment of employee free speech rights 
within the judgment (as will be discussed below), particularly since it does not explain why, 
even in contractual terms, the employer could (or should) discipline its employee for, or even 
assume responsibility for, discussions taking place outside the workplace even if they did 
cause offence to other employees. 
In order to justify disciplinary action, an employer might argue that the behaviour 
amounted to a significant breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence because, 
for example, the conduct brought them into disrepute.  Yet whether the level of harm required 
by the court/tribunal to satisfy this claim is sufficiently high enough to recognise an 
employee’s right to free expression is debatable.  For example, in Gosden v Lifeline Project 
Ltd,19 the claimant’s contract of employment specified gross misconduct as, amongst other 
things, ‘any act which is or is calculated to or may damage the company’s reputation or 
integrity’ (emphasis added).  The speculative ‘may’ rendered the clause particularly wide, 
allowing the tribunal to find that the claimant’s conduct – the act of forwarding an offensive 
e-mail, whilst at home, from a private account to the private account of an acquaintance 
working for the employer’s largest client – was something that ‘might damage the 
Respondent’s reputation and integrity’ (emphasis added) 20 even though it was the client’s 
employee who subsequently distributed it through the client’s e-mail system and even though 
the Respondent could not clearly identify how the act had, in fact, damaged their reputation 
or integrity. 
 Other decisions involving disliked expression (albeit not always involving digital 
speech) echo this concern.  In North West London Hospitals NHS Trust v Bowater,21 the EAT 
found that the employee’s decision to make light of a traumatic situation through a 
spontaneous but ill-judged comment was a sufficient reason to justify her dismissal.  Whilst 
sitting astride a naked, fitting man, in an attempt to restrain him and prevent serious injury, 
the respondent, a nurse, had purportedly remarked ‘it’s been a few months since I have been 
in this position with a man underneath me’.  Although heard by no one other than colleagues 
(the patient’s condition rendered him unaware) the employer found the comment disrespected 
the dignity of the patient, implied sexual innuendo with a patient, was inconsistent with the 
nurse’s professional duties and could have caused offence if overheard by a member of the 
public (emphasis added).22  In Look Ahead Housing and Care Ltd v Rudder23 an organisation 
providing housing, care and support services to vulnerable people and operating a ‘zero 
tolerance’ policy on ‘any form of discriminatory behaviour’ dismissed the respondent 
following a brief altercation with another member of staff which led to a complaint from a 
                                                          
17 Pringle v Lucas Industrial Equipment [1975] IRLR 266. 
18 ie, was the conduct is sufficiently serious that it shows a disregard for the ‘essential conditions’ of 
employment, Laws v London Chronicle Ltd [1959] 2 All ER 285, 287. 
19 Gosden v Lifeline Project Limited, case no. 2802731/2009. 
20 ibid, [11.3.4]. 
21 [2011] EWCA Civ 63. 
22 ibid, [41]. 
23 2010 WL 5139369. 
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resident.  The respondent had wanted to use a locked consultation room bearing a note 
marked ‘Praying’.  When chastised by a colleague for ignoring the note, the respondent 
allegedly said ‘This is not a place for prayer.  If people need to do so, they should go to 
church’.  Later, the respondent also allegedly said ‘It is not appropriate to use this space, as 
[the building] is limited for space anyway and I feel that Muslims are pushing us out’.  The 
EAT found that either statement would have been sufficient to justify dismissal.  In 
Rustamova v The Governing Body of Calder High School,24 a teacher was dismissed for 
publishing a book online, written by some of her pupils (as part of a school project), which 
was described as ‘racy’ and featured characters said to be recognisable as current staff and 
students.  Although, initially, the head had praised Mrs Rustamova for her work, calling it ‘a 
triumph’ for the way it had inspired the disengaged students involved, his attitude changed 
after publication.  The governing body found Rustamova’s actions to be ‘wholly 
unacceptable’, having concluded that publication breached confidentiality, brought the school 
and teaching profession into disrepute and undermined the head’s authority.  The ET and 
EAT accepted this assessment even though the question of how the publication did each of 
these things was left unsubstantiated in their decisions.  In Teggart v Teletech UK25 the 
employee harassed and bullied a colleague through Facebook.  His claim for unfair dismissal 
failed; the Tribunal accepted the employer’s view that his behaviour amounted to gross 
misconduct and brought the company into disrepute.  As with Rustamova, the latter element 
was not substantiated in the decision. 
Those protected by unfair dismissal law have a distinct advantage – in principle, at 
least – to those who may only bring a wrongful dismissal action since, of course, the 
‘reasonableness’ of the decision to dismiss will be considered as part of that claim.  During 
this process certain factors are taken into account, such as the employee’s length of service, 
their general performance and whether alternatives to dismissal were considered.  
McGoldrick has noted that signs of repentance are also particularly important.26  Yet such 
considerations sit awkwardly with free speech principle: for example, why should an 
employee show remorse for exercising their rights?   
Regardless of their merits, these cases are linked by two common features: first, the 
discernible view that the offence (or potential offence) caused by the expression was a 
sufficient reason to justify dismissal and, secondly (relatedly), the dismissive treatment of the 
free speech rights at stake, in which the claim was either analysed superficially or else 
entirely overlooked.  In Gosden, Rustamova, Rudder and Bowater, the prospective Art 10 
claims were not considered by the court, which is particularly surprising in Rustamova given 
the facts.  In Smith, although the court acknowledged counsel’s view that the case provoked 
important issues of principle about employee free speech rights, its treatment of the issue was 
cursory.  Since the employer was not a public authority and a statutory claim was not pursued, 
the right was found to provide only contextual significance to the dispute27 but, whatever this 
significance might have been, it is difficult to discern any meaningful contribution of free 
speech principle to the decision; the substantive outcome was dictated purely by contractual 
                                                          
24 Unreported, UKEAT/0284/11/ZT, November 2013. 
25 [2004] IRLR 625. 
26 McGoldrick, n 2, 140-141. 
27 Smith, n 14, [8]. 
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principles.  In Teggart the Tribunal was satisfied that the employee’s Art 10 rights had not 
been interfered with disproportionately because Art 10 ‘brings with it the responsibility to 
exercise that right in a way that is necessary for the protection of the reputation and rights of 
others’.28  This formulation echoes that used in an unrelated ET decision: that freedom of 
expression ‘must be exercised judiciously, responsibly and not recklessly’. 29   Yet this 
approach is deeply problematic.  It stimulates the use of morality to determine outcomes: that 
dismissal is acceptable where right-thinking people would not think the speech worth 
protecting.  Moreover, it is an attitude that inhibits free speech and damages societal 
discourse; it is akin to finding that the strength of an employee’s right to speak is linked to 
some independent assessment of whether it was prudent to exercise that right in the 
circumstances.  As will be shown, this manner of thinking conflicts with established free 
speech principle. 
 The object of this paper is not to challenge (necessarily) the outcomes of these cases 
(Teggart, in particular, is not a hard case) but rather to examine what they tell us about 
underlying attitudes toward employee free speech rights and doctrine’s capacity to safeguard 
those rights effectively.  The problem, it is submitted, stems from judicial neglect of, and 
misunderstanding of, the underlying free speech rights at stake such that instances of 
unpalatable and trivial expression are afforded little or no weight when determining the 
employee’s legal position.  It will be argued that the current doctrinal treatment of the right is 
weak and unreliable because: it envisages free speech as a right to be used ‘responsibly’ 
(implying that it should be used civilly or else only where ‘important matters’ are discussed); 
it employs too low a standard (potential offence) to justify dismissal for disliked expression, 
and so fails to guard against management oversensitivity; and it does not give voice to the 
broader value of free speech, as articulated in the established literature and wider case law. 
Sadly, this dismissive approach to free speech rights is discernible elsewhere in the 
common law.  Numerous examples exist of the courts treating Art 10 as if the level of 
protection it guarantees depends upon the inherent worth of the speech at stake, such that 
‘important’ expression is more deserving than ‘unimportant’ expression.30  For example, in 
Connolly v DPP, 31  the court concluded that interference with the offensive political 
expression of an anti-abortionist was justified based on the lower value of inefficient 
expression – the targeting of chemists stocking the morning after pill – over more effective 
expression, such as petitioning an MP.32  Similarly, in Sanders v Kingston (No 1),33 the court 
concluded that the ignorant, angry and unsolicited views of a town counsellor about Northern 
Ireland (which resulted in his dismissal) were not protected by Art 10 because they were 
instances of ‘personal anger’ and ‘vulgar abuse’ and, therefore, undeserving of any protection 
let alone the ‘high levels’ afforded to political expression.34  ‘Importance’, in these terms, is 
measured narrowly by the discernible contribution that the expression makes to democratic 
                                                          
28 Teggart, n 25, [6, (17)(c)]. 
29 Hill v Great Tey Primary School [2013] ICR 691, [14]. 
30 See discussion in J. Rowbottom, ‘To rant, vent and converse: protecting low level digital speech’ (2012) CLJ 
355, 368-370. 
31 Connolly v DPP [2007] EWHC 237 (Admin). 
32 ibid., [31]-[32]. 
33 [2005] EWHC 1145 (Admin). 
34 See, ibid, [79], [80] and [84]. 
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participation or as a check on abuses of power.35  The type of expression at stake in the 
typical social media dismissal case is unlikely to fare well on this scale.  Trivial expression, 
whether of an offensive, spontaneous, or otherwise anodyne nature, often has no such 
immediate value.  If the workplace free speech right protects expression only to the extent it 
demonstrably furthers democratic participation then it is no more than a weak right.  Of all 
the innumerable social interactions that take place in the workplace and outside of it there is 
very little an employee might say that would satisfy this test, particularly when scrutinised in 
the clinical environment of legal proceedings. 
 Yet this approach to freedom of speech conceptualises the ‘value’ of expression far 
too narrowly.  Even if the discernible value of the expression was taken to be a legitimate 
means of determining protection (which is debatable), it is possible to show how typical 
‘unimportant’ workplace speech may be societally valuable.  For example, employees need 
freedom to discover themselves, to present themselves (and their views) to others so as to 
influence how others see them, to refine their opinions based upon how others receive them, 
and to discover new and alternative ways of living through those interactions.  Individuals 
develop ideas and opinions about the world both in and outside the workplace.  These 
opinions might contribute to democratic participation (even in an indiscernible way) but, 
more immediately, they help employees form relationships with like-minded people or else 
promote personal growth through exposure to ideas and opinions that challenge their own.  
Employee expression is therefore valuable both instrumentally (for the self-discovery that 
follows) and intrinsically (because a society that allows such freedom is desirable regardless 
of the quality of the expression).  To allow employers ostensible control over employee 
expression impacts upon these important social interactions.  Yet a legal system of free 
speech protection that depends upon the inherent worth of the expression at stake is deeply 
problematic because, of course, courts and tribunals cannot measure this value reliably: they 
cannot say what the societal or individual benefits of this type of expression are or how that 
value compares with the value of the employer’s interests because the two are 
incommensurable; equally, they cannot reliably measure the societal value of ‘important’ 
speech either without resorting to conjecture. 
 Of course, freedom of expression can be conceptualised in different ways.36  In what 
follows, it will be argued that there is another pressing reason why courts and tribunals 
should not determine the extent of a person’s right to speak freely based upon some ad hoc 
appraisal of its apparent inherent worth, especially given its inability to do so reliably.  This 
reason lies in the established philosophical claim that individuality is an independent value 
and should be protected by the state from unwarranted coercive measures.  This liberal 
principle, however, seems to have little or no influence in judicial decision-making in the 
type of employment law claims considered above despite being determinative in other 
contexts, as will be shown.  Before showing how the law might better reflect this value, the 
following unpacks how this established liberal principle relates to the right to freedom of 
speech, particularly in an employment context. 
 
                                                          
35 See H. Fenwick and G. Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (OUP, 2006). 
36 See, eg, F. Schauer, Free Speech: a Philosophical Enquiry, (Cambridge University Press, 1982) 
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b) Individuality and freedom of expression 
 
As is well-known, the connection between individuality and freedom of expression 
underpins John Stuart Mill’s classic argument in On Liberty.37  Mill argues persuasively that 
interferences with expression are justified only by the harm of the expression and not due to 
its inherent worth.  His strong defence of free speech follows from the view that individuals 
in a free society should be treated as autonomous beings who are entitled to live relatively 
free from interference as they strive to realise their own conception of a worthwhile and 
satisfying life.  Through this process, though, they may acquire viewpoints that others find 
unpleasant, distasteful or offensive.  Mill is adamant, however, that expression deserves 
special treatment from interference not because the speech is valuable but because the 
discovery of individual ways of thinking and living is valuable.  Since individuals are 
autonomous beings, it is not for the state, or anyone else, to interfere with this process of self-
discovery unless it is necessary (see discussion below about this standard).  Mill’s theory is 
often treated as a consequentialist argument that relatively uninhibited expression will lead to 
the discovery of the ‘truth’.38  As other commentators have noted, such accounts tend to 
underestimate the sophistication of his position. 39   His essay may be more accurately 
described as an appeal for the law to provide a protective environment for the development of 
individuality, free from undue social pressure to conform.  The argument, therefore, seeks not 
only to constrain government but also to articulate a positive duty on them to protect 
individuals from the ‘tyrannical’ effect of the majority imposing its view of morality on 
others.  In Mill’s words, it is an argument against: 
 
‘the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other 
means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from 
them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in 
harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own.’40 
 
Comparison may be made between Mill’s ‘tyrannical majority’ and the employer who 
dismisses an employee for expression that it dislikes on moral grounds.  The protection of 
employer action in these circumstances evokes Mill’s concern about state tolerance of 
coercive means to ensure conformity with orthodox moral viewpoints and so nullify 
unorthodox ones.  In extreme cases, the enduring stigmatic quality of dismissal on an 
employee’s prospects of re-employment serves to ostracise that individual and might severely 
inhibit personal growth.  A similar effect may be achieved without recourse to dismissal 
where the threat of sanction exists.  Disciplinary action, or the threat of it, expresses 
condemnation of a particular viewpoint or way of life whilst judicial legitimation of that 
decision provides powerful public approval of the action.41  Employees who can only bring 
                                                          
37 J. S. Mill, On Liberty, in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, volume XVII, (University of Toronto Press, 
1977). 
38 See, eg, L. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society (OUP, 1986), 74. 
39 L. Alexander, Is There a Right to Freedom of Expression? (CUP, 2005), 128. 
40 ibid, 220. 
41 See discussion in J. Raz, ‘Free Expression and Personal Identification’ (1991) 11(3) OJLS 303 about freedom 
of expression as a means of validating different ways of life. 
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wrongful dismissal proceedings are particularly disadvantaged, to the extent that the law’s 
focus extends no further than those narrow questions of contractual interpretation and so 
ignores the broader question of whether liberal principle would tolerate the coercive action of 
controlling an individual’s personal development through the threat of dismissal or the public 
chastisement that dismissal brings.  In an unfair dismissal context, the law’s gaze is wider yet 
the liberty argument is far from fully realised given the inherent limitations within the court’s 
formulation of the band of reasonable responses test and the tacit sanctioning of managerial 
prerogative that accompanies it.42   
 The gap between practice and liberal principle illustrates the absence of the autonomy 
value at work.  This has an interesting effect on the legal anatomy of the opinionated 
employee.  In so many other contexts the actor’s autonomy animates the law’s response to the 
central issue.  For example, in cases concerning unlawful detention,43  assisted suicide,44 
misuse of private information 45  and quiet enjoyment of the home, 46  the courts clearly 
visualise the individual as an autonomous being who should be able to resist the attempts of 
others to deprive her of her liberty, or interfere with her bodily integrity or disclose personal 
information about her.  In an employment context, though, the value seems to fall away 
entirely but there is no obvious reason why employment law is so different and pressing 
reasons why meaningful protection against subjugation is necessary.  This is not to say that 
employers should never be able to discipline their employees for their expression.  As Mill 
recognises, there will be times where coercive measures against expression are justified but 
only in those limited circumstances where the harm to others requires it. 47   This harm 
principle is, as Sadurski has neatly summarised, a non-perfectionistic political principle: ‘its 
use is not conditional on the moral worth of individual actions, but only on the test of 
discernible harm to other people.  Coercive restraint must be independent of considerations of 
moral worth displayed by the action, or of moral virtue exhibited by the agent’.48  Since harm 
acts as a limiting principle the absence of any harm caused to the employer’s interests ought 
to prevent the employer taking action against the employee even though the employer may 
find the behaviour ‘foolish, perverse or wrong’. 49   Similarly, the location in which the 
employee expressed herself should be considered irrelevant to the process of determining 
protection.  These points are expanded upon below. 
Even if the reconciliation of practice with liberal principle is thought desirable, 
realising this goal is not straightforward.  As noted above, the established literature on 
enhancing human rights in the workplace advocates greater judicial engagement with the 
proportionality principle.  The following section argues that this approach will not reconcile 
                                                          
42 H. Collins, Justice in Dismissal: The Law of Termination of Employment (OUP, 1992); see also J. Bowers and A. 
Clark, ‘Unfair Dismissal and Managerial Prerogative: A Study of ‘Other Substantial Reason’’ (1981) 10 ILJ 34. 
43  Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2007] UKHL 45; (2008) 1 AC 385, [37] per Lord 
Hoffmann. 
44 R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2001] UKHL 61; (2002) 1 AC 800, [23] per Lord Bingham, [61] 
per Lord Steyn; R (Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] UKHL 45; (2010) 1 AC 345, [65]-[66] per 
Baroness Hale. 
45 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [50] per Lord Hoffmann. 
46 Harrow LBC v Qazi [2003] UKHL 43, (2004) 1 AC 983 [50] per Lord Hope. 
47 N 37, 213-310. 
48 W. Sadurski, ‘Joseph Raz on Liberal Neutrality and the Harm Principle’ (1990) 10 OJLS 122, 122. 
49 N 37, 226. 
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the differences with liberal principle unless the approach to Art 10 in an employment law 
context also changes.  The final section outlines one strategy by which this reconciliation 
might be achieved. 
 
3. Greater Engagement with the Proportionality Principle 
 
There is a rich and well-established academic debate about the appropriate treatment of 
human rights in employment law.50  Although the judiciary has sought to better realise such 
protection in the workplace it is commonly agreed that there remains much work to be done.  
For example, Collins has argued that the law’s protection of the individual from unfair 
dismissal should recognise, more explicitly, the liberal values of dignity and autonomy.51  
Mantouvalou has developed this by arguing that the law should safeguard against undue 
employer domination of the employee, particularly where the conduct occurs outside work.  
These arguments specifically recognise the typical imbalance of power between employer 
and employee generated by economic dependence, which gives the employer a ready means 
of interfering with individual liberty52 and significantly constrains an individual’s ability ‘to 
make her life choices as an autonomous agent’.53  To ensure that these values are properly 
respected, commentators have consistently advocated closer engagement with the Strasbourg 
proportionality principle as a means of augmenting the fairness test in unfair dismissal law.54  
In short, the proportionality principle, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”), states that interferences with a qualified right (such as Art 10) are justified only 
when prescribed by law, where a legitimate aim is furthered (as specified in Art 10(2)) and 
when proportionate to the realisation of that aim.55  The protection of an employer’s business 
interests would count as a legitimate aim.56  Mantouvalou, in particular, advocates a temporal 
distinction so that dismissals for behaviour outside of working time are justified only where 
the employer can demonstrate either the employee’s behaviour directly affected her work (or 
there is a strong likelihood that it would have) or damaged the employer’s reputation (or there 
is a strong likelihood it would have).57 
For the paradigm case of trivial employee expression, encouraging judges to apply the 
proportionality principle is not enough even when Mantouvalou’s formulation is applied.  
Further judicial direction is required.  Mantouvalou’s claims about the temporal distinction 
are important but her context is privacy.  Whilst the argument may have relevance in 
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dismissals concerning disliked expression (it may have addressed the problem in Smith and 
Gosden for example) it does not engage with the central claim of this paper that free speech 
rights may arise both outside and within the workplace.  Moreover, there is a distinct 
possibility that judges may conclude the current approach to resolving disputes already 
complies with the proportionality principle: that the interferences are proportionate to the 
weight of the free speech claim.  This approach can be seen, for example, in Connolly and 
Sanders, outlined above.  Underpinning it is a view that ‘unimportant expression’ requires 
less protection than ‘important expression’, which of itself may be informed by the ECtHR 
principle that interferences with political expression are rarely justifiable.58  The legitimacy 
of this treatment is addressed below.  Yet its effect on proportionality is to lower the level of 
harm required to justify interference with trivial expression.  There is evidence of this low 
standard at work in the cases discussed above.  For example, in Gosden, the tribunal did not 
rely upon evidence of actual harm to reach their decision but, instead, was satisfied that 
prospective harm, arising from clients thinking less of the employer, was sufficient.  
Similarly, in Teggart the tribunal found the employee’s behaviour was capable of bringing 
the employer into disrepute yet its reasoning is elliptical (though, to be sure, the effect on the 
bullied employee was unassailable proof of harm justifying dismissal).  Likewise, in 
Rustamova the tribunal accepted the employer’s assessment that the employee’s idiosyncratic 
behaviour somehow brought the school and profession into disrepute yet the reasoning is 
similarly elusive.  Through this treatment, ‘unimportant’ expression may be readily interfered 
with.  Consequently, more is required to ensure that those same assessments of inherent 
worth creeping into determinations about the reasonableness of dismissal do not inform 
discussions about the proportionality of interference. 
Reconceptualization of the substantive workplace free speech right is required to 
address this problem.  This involves two stages.  First, the substantive free speech right 
should be bolstered: there should be sustained judicial recognition that Art 10 values speech 
not only for its contribution to democratic participation but also for its contribution to, and as 
a signifier of, individual autonomy and self-realisation.  The judicial task, therefore, is not to 
assign a specific value to the expression itself, contingent upon some ad hoc assessment of its 
inherent worth in democratic participation terms, but to assume a constant high value in 
recognition of the societal importance of these broader underlying values.  Secondly, 
modification of the judicial approach to proportionality is also required.  This requires a 
paradigm shift in thinking.  Disputes concerning employee expression should not be resolved 
by judges asking, in effect, why unimportant expression should be protected, especially 
where others react adversely to it, but rather by asking what warrants an employer controlling 
(or otherwise insidiously influencing) the formation of its employees’ opinions.  To do 
otherwise allows employers to interfere with individual autonomy, by reprimanding the 
employee and seeking to dictate their moral development through coercive means, in 
circumstances where a state actor would be unable to.  This change in perspective better 
accords with the liberal principle at stake in these cases.  It is one thing for employers to 
discipline employees where their duties and responsibilities are adversely affected, or where 
the employer can demonstrate sufficient harm has been or would be caused to its reputation, 
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but it is another to permit employer control over an employee’s development of their moral, 
political and social outlook.  By raising the standard of harm required and by ensuring that 
views about the inherent worth of the expression form no part of the proportionality exercise, 
these concerns may be addressed. 
 Mill’s harm principle lends itself to this reconceptualization.  Mill argues that harm is 
a necessary but not sufficient reason to interfere with expression59 (and this view is apparent 
elsewhere in liberal argument). 60   Thus his argument is not that expression should be 
restricted because it harms others but, rather, that expression should not be restricted where it 
does not harm.  In other words, the harm principle is a limiting principle, it seeks to do no 
more than exclude penalties for behaviour that does not harm but it does not justify penalties 
for all harm.  Once harm is identified, Millian reasoning requires further consideration of the 
extent to which the harm is prevented or else remedied through the proposed penalty; it is the 
trigger point for debate about the most appropriate method of dealing with the expression in a 
manner that best upholds liberal principles, including the protection of rights. 
Determining the standard of harm required to justify interference is a matter for 
further debate so far as Mill is concerned.  Some general observations might be made about 
this standard applied to an employment law context.  Despite its apparent simplicity the harm 
principle is ‘a very complex concept with hidden normative dimensions’61 and its nature and 
meaning deserves consideration.  Where the principle is apparent in the cases examined 
above, it appears to have been given an intuitive meaning.  For example, the actual or 
prospective alteration of views held by a third party about the employer due to the expression 
is taken to be evidence of harm.  As one commentator has argued, an intuitive understanding 
of the term ‘harm’ is prone to this type of approach such that any speech which influences a 
recipient to change their view may fall within the definition.62  Moreover, harm is treated as a 
particularly powerful validation for employer interference in this context.  Although this is 
understandable, there are many instances in which an identifiable harm suffered by the 
employer would not automatically justify subsequent disciplinary action.  For example, ill-
health, divorce, bereavement, ill-health of a dependent, tardiness, insomnia, pregnancy, 
paternity and financial troubles may all detrimentally impact upon an employee’s 
productivity and, ultimately, the employer’s profitability.  It is not simply that some of these 
factors are statutorily protected or that sanctions would be contrary to good employment 
practices.  It is also, surely, because we accept that no employee can constantly perform at 
optimal efficiency, work in perfect harmony with colleagues or meet every customer’s 
service expectations.  The reasons for this chime with notions of dignity and respect but also 
liberty and individual autonomy.  These observations suggest that both the meaning and 
effect of harm requires a sophisticated level of treatment. 
In the context of the criminal law, Feinberg has argued that the harm principle is only 
satisfied when an individual acts in a way that is wrong and ‘morally indefensible’ and ‘not 
only sets back the victim’s interest but also violates his right’.63  Whilst the application of a 
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criminal standard is not appropriate to a civil context, the term ‘wrongdoing’ could be used to 
signify wrongdoing under the contract of employment and so capture acts that are 
inconsistent with its terms.  Feinberg’s argument is particularly useful since it excludes 
liability for ‘set-back interests produced by justified or excused conduct (“harms” that are not 
wrongs) and violations of rights that do not set back interests (wrongs that are not 
“harms”)’.64  This approach is appealing since it conceives harm narrowly, which is vital if 
the principle is to serve its instrumental function in the liberal strategy to normalise tolerance 
in all right-thinking members of society.65  Applying this modified version of Feinberg’s 
analysis to the cases considered above, the operative notion of wrongdoing is problematic in 
several whilst other cases indicate some blurring between wrongdoing and harm to justify the 
dismissal.  Gosden stands out as an example of harm without accompanying wrongdoing.  
The tribunal’s view of the reputational damage caused by disseminating the offensive e-mail 
was framed in these terms: ‘one of its largest customers was now of the view that it had been 
content to employ a person who held...views which were inimical to its objects and values’.66  
Yet this is (or otherwise seems to be) a moral judgement on the behaviour and not an 
evaluation of contractual breach; the Tribunal does not say how the act of dissemination 
breached the employee’s contractual obligations nor does it account for the fact of the 
recipient’s further dissemination.  Conversely, Bowater appears to be an example of 
wrongdoing without harm.  Bowater may have acted unprofessionally however it is not clear 
how the wrongdoing ‘harmed’ the employer given that no member of the public witnessed 
the event.  Of course, it is possible to treat the risk of harm as harm if it is sufficiently serious 
enough67 though, arguably, the standard is not met here.  Some discussion might also be had 
as to whether Bowater’s actions were sufficiently serious to warrant classification as 
wrongdoing.  Unprofessional behaviour such as venting, gossiping or clowning about with 
colleagues away from public gaze is, surely, of a different character to behaving in a similar 
manner in front of clients or customers.  The EAT does not seem to have considered this 
important distinction.  In Rustamova there is no real consideration of how the act of online 
publication (which seems to have been the critical issue) breached the employee’s contract 
(vague references to obligations like confidentiality aside) or how the act did in fact harm 
either the school or the profession’s reputation prospectively or actually. 
We may, therefore, debate whether Feinberg’s standard of harm has been reached in 
these cases but, even if it has, further discussion is still required as to whether this harm ought 
to be treated as sufficient to justify the disciplinary action taken.  The proportionality 
principle is of assistance since it requires the court to examine the reasons why the 
employer’s response was proportionate to the harm caused.  The tribunal needs to be 
persuaded that the harm was sufficiently serious to justify the ultimate sanction of dismissal.  
As noted above, it has been argued that the proportionality test requires evidence of a ‘clear 
and present impact or a high likelihood of such impact on [the employee’s ability to] work’.68  
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Also, arguably, it should be shown how disciplinary action remedied the harm caused.  This 
requires careful examination of the actual harm suffered.  Arguably, the employer is most 
justified when responding in a manner that does no more than neutralise the harm caused.  
Thus the proper response is not necessarily to punish the expression but, rather, to consider 
whether it is possible to neutralise or otherwise diminish the harm caused by it whilst 
preserving the rights at stake.  In certain circumstances, disciplinary action, including 
dismissal, will be an appropriate sanction.  For example, the dismissal of the employee in 
Teggart was proportionate to the harm caused to his colleague and a legitimate means of 
extinguishing that harm.  However, disciplinary action is not usually a method of 
compensating the employer for the harm caused but rather serves as a means of punishing the 
employee for her behaviour.  It is a coercive measure that may have severe and long-lasting 
consequences for the affected employee on their reputation, confidence and ability to secure 
meaningful alternative employment.  In the paradigmatic case, it is not just harm to the 
employer’s interests that are at stake, the employee’s interests are also harmed, for example, 
due to the stigmatic quality of dismissal, the loss of income, the difficulties of finding a 
suitable alternative position, etc.  Often, then, it is not simply a matter of the court protecting 
one form of harm but rather choosing between two types of harm.  The final section considers 
how these observations on proportionality might be realised in practice. 
 
4. Strategy for Realisation in Practice 
 
The view that the inherent worth of speech rather than the harm it causes is the determinative 
factor for proportionality purposes is evident in the academic literature69 and is discernible in 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence.70   Former ECtHR President Luzius Wildhaber has written, 
extra-judicially, that ‘ultimately it is the role played in democratic society by the expression 
at issue which determines the level of protection that will be accorded to it’.71  Yet these 
views are not unassailable.  First, although the inherent worth of the expression may be 
relevant it is not determinative: although political expression is so closely allied to democracy 
that interference is rarely permissible, 72  the ECtHR has made it tolerably clear that 
interference with other types of expression is only acceptable where the reasoning is coherent 
and speaks directly to one of the harmful effects outlined in Art 10(2), such as national 
security, public safety, the rights of others, etc.73   
 Secondly, even if inherent worth was treated as determinative by the ECtHR, it does 
not follow that the UK’s approach must replicate this system of free speech protection.  It is 
generally accepted that the ECHR establishes a floor of rights, not a ceiling, which member 
states are encouraged to develop to suit their own local conditions.74  Sadly, the opportunity 
for judicial activism that this might otherwise signify has stalled in the UK due to the 
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judiciary’s decidedly deferential view that UK courts must ‘keep pace’ with Strasbourg ‘no 
more, no less’. 75   This ‘mirror principle’ has been the subject of constant academic 
criticism.76  As Baroness Hale, writing extra-judicially, reminds us, the principle is ‘odd’ 
since the Strasbourg jurisprudence ‘is not binding upon anyone, even upon them.  They have 
no concepts of ratio decidendi and stare decisis.  Their decisions are, at best, an indication of 
the broad approach which Strasbourg will take to a particular problem’.77  Hale questions the 
strictness of the mirror principle, in any event, having identified three House of Lords 
decisions that went beyond Strasbourg principle.78  Yet, thirdly, even if the mirror principle is 
applied strictly, its limiting effect is considerably lessened given that Strasbourg has yet to 
decide a case matching the paradigm of trivial but disliked employee expression.  With these 
points in mind, the following navigates a way through the Strasbourg then UK jurisprudence 
in order to challenge the view that the ECtHR’s approach to Art 10 protection is based on the 
inherent worth of expression, not the harm caused, and so construct a set of supportive 
principles endorsing the liberal approach advocated above. 
The ECtHR has consistently stated that freedom of expression ‘constitutes one of the 
essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress 
and for each individual's self-fulfilment.’ 79   The inclusion of this latter phrase clearly 
acknowledges that Art 10 applies to a broader range of values than simply democratic 
participation.  Since self-fulfilment is valuable both instrumentally and intrinsically, the 
beneficial effect of particular speech upon the speaker or audience is not only unmeasurable 
(reliably, at least) in an instrumental sense but also to treat this calculation as determinative 
would neglect the value of a legal system that allows people to express themselves freely.  
Similarly, the ECtHR has said Art 10 applies ‘not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are 
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those 
that offend, shock or disturb’.80  Consequently, although the inherent worth of expression 
might be recognised judicially, a precise calculation of it should not inform the outcome of 
the claim.  Such an approach is apparent, from time to time, in the Strasbourg jurisprudence.  
For example, in Krone Verlag GmbH v Austria, a case concerning comparative advertising, 
the court acknowledged the value of the expression in broad terms: ‘for the public, 
advertising is a means of discovering the characteristics of services and goods offered to 
them’.81  Significantly, there was neither further appraisal of its inherent worth nor derogative 
comparison to political expression.  Instead, the proportionality analysis was conducted 
solely by reference to whether the potential harm of the expression justified the interference: 
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‘Sometimes [advertising may] be restricted, especially to prevent unfair competition and untruthful or 
misleading advertising.  In some contexts, even the publication of objective, truthful advertisements 
might be restricted in order to ensure respect for the rights of others or owing to the special 
circumstances of particular business activities and professions.  Any such restrictions must, however, 
be closely scrutinised by the Court, which must weigh the requirements of those particular features 
against the advertising in questions’82 
 
Thus, having recognised comparative advertising as something deserving of protection under 
Art 10, the court’s analysis of its inherent worth played no part in determining whether the 
right had been violated.  This approach provides a more supportive environment for trivial 
expression than UK doctrine does.  Faced with the paradigm, the Strasbourg court might 
recognise that social media has positive effects in allowing people, as one commentator has 
put it, to rant, vent or converse.83  It might also reiterate that Art 10 protects speech that 
shocks, offends or disturbs. 
The recent ECtHR decision in Redfearn v UK84 provides some encouragement for 
judicial reappraisal of employee Art 10 rights and the need to treat free speech claims 
seriously.  Redfearn’s employer dismissed him after his election as a local councillor for the 
BNP, fearing this would cause anxiety to clients and damage its reputation.  The ECtHR 
accepted the applicant’s submission that dismissal was ‘capable of striking at the very 
substance of his rights’ under Arts 10 and 11 (freedom of association).85  Significantly, the 
court’s stern criticism of existing UK law (it insisted the UK must relax its rules on the 
minimum qualifying period for unfair dismissal complaints concerning political expression) 
positively ignored any attendant difficulties with the nature of the expression at stake.86  The 
Court might have been more magnanimous: in other circumstances it has said that political 
parties whose mandate conflicts with democratic principles cannot claim protection under the 
ECHR.87  Instead, the Court reiterated88 its well-established principle that Art 11 (and, by 
extension, Art 10) applies to expression that ‘offends, shocks or disturbs’.89 
In determining whether an interference is proportionate, the Strasbourg court allows 
member states a ‘margin of appreciation’ to determine how best to secure the right in light of 
local conditions.90  This requires consideration of the provisions in Art 10(2).  Although it is 
said the right carries ‘duties and responsibilities’, the view (noted above) that this means the 
right must be exercised ‘responsibly’ is profoundly mistaken.  As noted in the academic 
literature, ‘to argue…such wording suggests an inherent greater limitation envisaged in the 
freedom of expression is untenable.  Indeed, there is no room for implied limitations in 
Article 10’. 91   It has been argued the notion only applies where speakers have some 
demonstrable, special societal obligation, either due to the nature of their position, ie, because 
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they are lawyers, journalists, civil servants, etc,92 or due to the nature of the information 
divulged, ie, because they are whistle-blowing.93  Therefore, no general obligation to use the 
right ‘responsibly’ can be inferred.  Instead, interference is only potentially lawful where one 
(or more) of the nine legitimate aims listed in Art 10(2) is at stake.  These aims all speak to 
different types of harms that might justify interference.  Where trivial expression is involved, 
the protection of morals or the rights of others are most likely relevant.  The court will allow 
a wide discretion where there is ‘no consensus’ across Europe on how an issue should be 
treated, particularly where ‘sensitive moral or ethical issues’ are involved.94 
Yet this discretion does not provide member states with carte blanche.  The ECtHR 
has consistently stated that the margin of appreciation goes ‘hand in hand with European 
supervision’ such that the court is ‘empowered to give the final ruling on whether a 
‘restriction’ is reconcilable’ with the Convention right.95  Consequently, the court must be 
satisfied that the member state ‘applied standards which were in conformity with the 
principles embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they relied on an acceptable assessment 
of the relevant facts’.96  In other words, the court must be satisfied that the reasons for 
interference are coherent and persuasive.  The court will, therefore, scrutinise the reasons 
offered for why the nature of the breach of obligations by the employee and the damage 
suffered by the employer were so severe as to justify the ultimate sanction of dismissal.97  
This requires careful analysis of the seriousness of its consequences.98 
These overarching statements of principle in the Strasbourg jurisprudence are also 
discernible in the wider domestic case law.  For example, recognition of the broader values 
underpinning Art 10, beyond democratic participation, can be seen in Lord Steyn’s oft-quoted 
speech in ex parte Simms: 
 
‘Freedom of expression is, of course, intrinsically important: it is valued for its own sake.  But it is well 
recognised that it is also instrumentally important...  First, it promotes the self-fulfilment of individuals 
in society.  Secondly, in the famous words of Holmes J. (echoing John Stuart Mill), “the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market”... Thirdly, 
freedom of speech is the lifeblood of democracy’99 
 
In apparent recognition of the self-fulfilment value, the Court of Appeal has found that to 
treat trivial content, like ‘social banter or discourtesy’, as defamatory would violate Art 10.100  
Similarly, in a privacy context, it has been held that Art 10 is capable of protecting ‘banal or 
trivial expression’.101  In Chambers v DPP, the High Court was at pains to point out that the 
Communications Act 2003 had no ‘chilling effect’ on irreverence: 
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‘Satirical, or iconoclastic, or rude comment, the expression of unpopular or unfashionable opinion 
about serious or trivial matter, banter or humour, even if distasteful to some or painful to those 
subjected to it should and no doubt will continue at their customary level, quite undiminished by this 
legislation... [users] are free to speak not what they ought to say, but what they feel’102 
 
Similarly, the UK courts have recognised that Art 10 applies equally to expression which 
shocks, disturbs or offends. 103   For example, the High Court has previously noted that 
‘freedom only to speak inoffensively is not worth having’.104   
Moreover, the case law reveals some judicial disquiet with the view that expression 
should be protected according to its inherent worth.  In Hill v Great Tey Primary School, the 
EAT was highly critical of the ET’s reductive treatment of Art 10 as a right that must be 
exercised ‘judiciously, responsibly and not recklessly’.105  Away from employment law, the 
High Court has also expressed concern at narrow readings of Art 10.  In Miranda v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department,106 the court noted that ‘freedom of speech may indeed be 
“the lifeblood of democracy”; but...the perception of free expression as a servant of 
democracy...would tend to devalue non-political speech...  [F]ree thought, which is a 
condition of every man’s flourishing, needs free expression...  I introduce these 
reflections...because, it seems to me, they make the ideal of free speech larger not smaller’. 
In an employment law context, a judicial finding that Art 10 applies should, in 
principle, alter the court’s approach to the fairness test so as to ensure the right is more 
robustly protected.  It is not enough that the tribunal thinks it understandable that an employer 
or their clients might react adversely to the expression. 107   There should be careful 
consideration of the alleged breach of obligation by the employee, the harmful effect caused 
by the expression and on the seriousness of the sanction in order to determine if the 
interference with Art 10 is justified.108  Harm is determinative: a technical or trivial breach of 
an obligation is not of itself sufficient to justify dismissal.  For example, by analogy, the 
House of Lords has previously stated that the law does not protect trivial breaches of 
confidence.109  Similarly, prospective employer claims that the expression undermines mutual 
trust and confidence must meet the seriousness threshold set for this implied term. 110  
Adoption of this general approach recognises Feinberg’s claim that there should be both a 
‘wrong’ and ‘harm’ before interferences are justified.  Whilst the requisite level of harm is 
fact-specific, crucially, it is not contingent upon the inherent worth of the expression.   
In assessing the detriment to the employer, the tribunal may recognise the ‘interest in 
protecting the commercial success and viability of companies for the benefit of shareholders 
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and employees [and] also for the wider economic good’,111 however, the tribunal must be 
satisfied that damage has been or would be caused to those interests by the employee’s 
expression.  This ought not to be assumed and some scrutiny of the employer’s claim is 
required.  In defamation law there is recognition that the proportionality principle requires the 
resultant harm of the expression to meet a level of seriousness before it is actionable112 since 
penalising trivial harms would violate Art 10.113  To this end, there has been recent judicial 
reliance114 on the dicta of Lord Atkins in Sim v Stretch:115 
 
‘That juries should be free to award damages for injuries to reputation is one of the safeguards of 
liberty.  But the protection is undermined when exhibitions of bad manners or discourtesy are placed on 
the same level as attacks on character and are treated as actionable wrongs’ 
 
In defamation, the seriousness threshold depends on whether ‘the ordinary, reasonable and 
sensible person’ would think less of the claimant as a consequence.116  This standard may be 
transposed easily to the employment context and applied to the prospective or actual damage 
caused, whether external (eg, clients/customers) or internal (eg, other employees).  Where 
other employees object to the expression the tribunal should consider whether it was 
reasonable not only that the affected employee was offended but also that it was reasonable 
that the offended employee should attribute offence to the employer’s actions (or inactions) 
or that it was reasonable that the offended employee should expect the employer to intervene 
due to their subjective reaction.  This also gives the tribunal scope to restrict the operation of 
wide and discretionary disciplinary clauses (or similar provisions), particularly those 
ostensibly regulating employee behaviour outside work, such as in Smith.  The tribunal might 
similarly consider steps taken by the employer to minimise any prospective reputational 
damage through disassociation; a step Hardwicke chambers took recently when a leading 
barrister expressed concern for aged celebrities accused of historic sex offences.117 
 By adopting the above strategy, employee free speech rights may be better protected.  
Yet there are two particular issues with realising this strategy that require addressing.  First, it 
relies upon a degree of judicial activism both in recognition of the threat to liberty and the 
consequent concerted sympathetic response required to resolve the problem.  There may be 
less appetite for this at tribunal level.  Therefore, realising meaningful change may require 
policy-maker intervention.  Recent Art 10 related inquiries give hope for political support for 
this view.  In his much publicised inquiry into the culture and ethics of the press, Lord Justice 
Leveson pointedly distinguished press freedom from individual freedom of expression on the 
basis that the latter ‘has its roots in a very personal conception of what it is to be human’.118  
Similarly, in its recommendations for changes to defamation law, the Ministry of Justice 
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proposed that, to be actionable, claimants must demonstrate that the contested expression 
caused substantial harm, so as to ensure compatibility with Art 10.119  Whilst such comments 
suggest political support for liberty arguments, political intervention through legislative 
change is unlikely to resolve the problem since (aside from other concerns) policy-makers 
tend to conclude that the meaning of free speech is a matter best left to judges.120  Yet if 
tribunal judges lack confidence to engage in the requisite level of judicial activism, and given 
that such disputes will rarely progress to appellate level, then the status quo is likely to 
remain.  One possible solution might be through ACAS intervention.  ACAS already has a 
policy on social media but this says nothing about the meaning of free speech or why trivial 
employee speech might deserve protection.  If ACAS modified its policy to reflect the 
discussion above then the prospect of changing the prevailing culture at ground level would 
be increased. 
 Secondly, even if these obstacles are overcome, this would create a two-tier system of 
protection in which those qualifying for unfair dismissal law protection or those working in 
the public sector would have greater rights than everyone else.  Individuals with only a 
wrongful dismissal claim are particularly vulnerable given that purely contractual approaches 
govern the outcome, as Smith shows.  Greater debate is required on how these individuals 
might be better protected.  Whilst it is not an ideal solution, the judiciary might develop its 
common law principles (when the High Court route is taken) to reflect, more explicitly, 
liberal reasoning, as it has done in restraint of trade cases, even where a clear, contrary 
contractual clause exists.121  The courts have invalidated restraint of trade clauses that go 
beyond what is necessary to protect the legitimate business interests of the employer on the 
basis that it deprives the employee of ‘individual liberty of action in trading’.122 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The doctrinal approach to employee free speech rights is disappointing and perhaps 
demonstrates a lack of familiarity with the importance of individual freedom of expression.  
Whilst it may be that the type of expression at stake is not significant or important, 
objectively speaking, trivial expression does not deserve trivial protection.  The 
disconnection from liberal principle is stark: doctrine does not show sufficient recognition 
either that individual expression is vital to individuality and self-fulfilment or of its intrinsic 
value as a signifier of a liberal society that treats individuals as autonomous beings.  
Consequently, even greater engagement with the proportionality principle would do little to 
bolster employee free speech rights because the necessity of the interference is often linked to 
the significance of the expression involved.  Yet greater realisation of liberal principle is 
possible.  The Strasbourg jurisprudence and domestic case law shows ample recognition of 
these values.  Through a concerted and sympathetic judicial approach, doctrinal inadequacies 
may be addressed by removing consideration of inherent worth from the process of 
determining harm during the proportionality exercise.  Modification of the ACAS policy on 
                                                          
119 Ministry of Justice, Draft Defamation Bill Consultation, Consultation Paper CP3/11 (Cm 8020), 8-9. 
120 N 118, 1508, [4.3]; Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions: Report (HL Paper 273; HC 1443), [50]. 
121 De Francesco v Barnum (1890) 45 Ch. D. 430, 438. 
122 Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Company Ltd [1894] AC 535. 
Page 21 of 21 
 
social media would buttress this strategy so as to achieve more immediate results at ground 
level.  Through this strategy, practice would recognise that freedom of expression is not a 
right that must be used judiciously, responsibly or diplomatically.  It is far greater than that. 
